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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FR~-\.XK

E. DOLE,
PlaiJitiff,

I

YS.

S~-\.LT

LAKE LAU~DRY, THE
INDUSTRIAL CO~I~IISSIO~
OF l'"TAH and THE STATE
IXSL"RANCE FUND,
Defendants.

No. 7157

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
STATE~IEXT

On ~lay 28. 1947. Frank E. D'Ole filed an application
with the Industrial Con1n1ission of Utah in which he
alleged that he had sustained an accidental injury on
~larch 26, 1946, while he \\~af' in the Plnploy of the Salt
Lake Laundry as its manager. In his application and in
his testimony at the Industrial Commission hearing he
stated that his accident consisted of a severe jolting
while he ,,~as driving his automobile on Red-wood Road
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
going from Salt Lake City to Kearns, Utah, on business
of the Sa1t Lake Laundry. He claimed that he received
a detached retina in his right eye as a result of this
severe jolting, which eventually resulted in total blindness of the eye. After hearing the case, the Industrial
Commission rendered i.ts decision on December 3, 1947,
in which the Oommission denied Mr. Dole's application
for compensation. Mr. Dole, through his attorney, has
brought the case to the Supreme Court of Utah and has
attacked the Industrial Commission's decision as being
erroneous and illegal.
The 8taten1ent of Facts contained in the first part
of Plaintiff's brief fairly summarizes most of the testimony found in the transcript of evidence. However it
also contains numerous comments by Plaintiff's counsel
relating to portions of the .testimony. Naturally, we do
not concede that eounsel 's con1ments should be given the
same weight as the witnesses' testimony.
ARGU~1ENT

In its decision the Indus·trial Commission said that
it was "not convinced that the applicant sustained an
injury arising out of or in the course of his emploJinent
on the date as alleged by applicant on March 26, 1946,
and therefore finds .that the application should be denied.'' This amounted, in substance and effect, to a finding that Mr. Dole did not sustain a compensable accidental injury arising out of or in the course of his employment. As a basis for this conclusion, we refer to the case
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of Thontp~oll
cited.

r~.

Industrial ('om mission, lwn·inafh•r

In order for the Plaintiff to havt' any justification
for requesting the Supreine Court to annul the Industrial
Conuuission 's decision, he n1ust establish
that the Industrial Con1n1issi~n "·as required,
as a matter of la"·· to find that ~Ir. Dole did sustain an
accidental injury on March 26. 1946, arising out of or
in the course of his en1ployn1ent.
(1)

and
(:2) that the Industrial Commission was required
as a matter of law to find that said accidental injury was
the cause of, or was a material factor in causing, the
eventual detached retina which resulted in Mr. Dole's
loss of sight in his right eye.

POINT 1.
THE -INDUSTRIAL COJ\LMISSION vYAS NOT
REQUIRED TO FIXD THAT MR. DOLE SUSTAINED AX ACCIDENTAL INJURY IN HIS EMPLOY:JIEXT OX ~IARCH 26, 1946.
POINT 2.
THE INDUSTRIAL COM~IISSION \YAS NOT
REQUIRED TO FIND THAT THE APPLICANT'S
DETACHED RETINA \YAS CAUSED BY AN ACCIDE~T IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
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These two points are so intenY'OVen that \Ye shall
consider them together. In this brief we shall refer to ·
the transcript of the Industrial Comn1ission 's hearing
held June 24, 1947, as 1 Tr. We shall refer to the transcript of the Industrial Comn1ission 's hearing held November 14, 1947, as 2 Tr.
One discrepancy in .Jlr. Dole's statements appears in
the record as follows: In his testim,ony Dole said that
on .March 26, 1946, while driving his automobile on Redwood Road he went over a very rough pieee of road and
imn1ediately his right eye went blind. He sa1d he went
to Dr. Saunders the follmving n1orning, Dr. Saunders
exan1ined the eye and asked him how it happened (1 Tr.
5). But Dr. Saunders testified quite definitely that when
~Ir. Dole can1e to see him on March 27, 1946, he conlplained of blurring vision in his right eye. Dr. Saunders
examined the eye that day and also the following day,
March 28, 1946, and he found that Mr. Dole had 20-30
vision in his right eye, which is substantially normal
vision (1 Tr. 17 & 18). Dr. Saunders further stated that
~lr. Dole did not say anything to him ~bout any trip
on the highway or about any violent shaking. Dr. Saunders said he did not recall that there '''as any mention
made of any specific instance where all of a sudden the
eye seen1ed to lose its vision. (1 Tr. 18 & 19). Dr. Saunders said he saw a degenerative process in the eye, a
gradual developn1ent of a degenerative process (1 Tr.
20). He said that about April 25th Dole's vision in the
right eye was down to 20-70 (1 Tr. 20). Dr. Saunders
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further te~tified that if .Mr. Dole had suffen'd a retinal
detachn1ent at the tin1e of the alleged shakeup on Mnreh
~G. 1946. yon would have expected an innnediate loss of
vision and you would not have found a 20-30 v~sion the
next day. That mnount of vision indicated that there
wa~ no detached retina at that tin1e (1 Tr. 27).
In his testiinony ~[r. D.ole stated that he was all
alone in his autonwbile when the alleged accident occtured. Therefore, his own staten1ents, both when he
was testifying before the Industrial Comn1ission and also
the statements which he n1ade to various doctors many
months after ~Iarch 2G, 1946, are the only evidence in
the record upon the basis ,of which there could have been
any finding that he had sustained an accidental injury
on the date and in the manner he alleged.
\Ye should not need to cite more than a few decisions
of the Supreme Court of Utah to show adequate ~egal
support for sustaining the Industrial Commission's order
denying compensation in this case.
In the case of Gagos vs. Industrial Commission, 87
Utah 101, 48 Pae. (2nd) 449, the Court's opinion contains the following:
''The fact finder is not always required ,to
believe the uncontradicting evidence of a witness,
as will be seen from the text and the cases cited
in support thereof in 23 C. J. p. 47, sec. 1791.
There are a number of facts and circumstances in
the ins,tant case which may have caused the com-·
n1ission to disbelieve the testimony of Mr. Gagos.
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He was interested in the result of the controversy.

* * *"
In the n1ore recent case ·of Smith vs. Industrial ConLmission, 104 Utah 318, 140 Pac. (2nd) 314, the prevailing
opinion of the Court concludes with these words:
"This indicates that where the evidence is
·wholly that of an interested witness the trier of
fact may reasonably refuse to believe it. Of
course, the fact that a witness is corr,oborated on
one point does not require the trier of fact to believe him on o,ther material points where there is
no corroboration. In view of the fact that applicant was the only witness to· testify to the accident,
to the resultting sensations, and to his reasons for
not reporting it to his employer, and the further
fact that these facts were by their very nature
exclusively within his own knowledge and ,therefore could not be controverted by other testimony,
the·commission could reasonably refuse to believe
his testimony, which they apparently did."
The case of Vecchio vs. Ind. Comm. was brought to
the Supren1e Court two different times. The Court's
first decis:Von is found at 82 Utah 128, 22 Pac. (2nd) 212.
The Industrial Commission had held a hearing on J anuary 1, 1932, regarding Mrs. Vecchio's claim for con1pensation on account of the death of her husband. It was
apparent from the Conm1ission's decision that the Con11nission had the erroneous idea that certain res gestae
testimony was inadn1issible as being hearsay evidence.
Consequently the Supreme Court_ reversed the Connnission 's decision and re1nanded the case for fu.rther pro-
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ceedings. Thereafter the Commission held anoth<>r l~<·n ring at which the te~tinumy of the pn'Yious hearing wa~
again plaeed in evidence a~ \Yl'll as additional Pvid<'lWP.
The Con11nission again denied the application for COlllpensation. )[r~. Yecchio again took tlw case to the Suprenw Court. which rendered its decision at 84 Utah 528,
37 Pac. ( :?nd) 3-!:?. In this later decision, the Supreine
Court sustained the Industrial Con11nission 's denial of
compensation. In the last paragraph of the Oourt 's opinion is found the following:
··The Commission n1ay well have believed
that it was in1probable that the injury in question
\Yas received by the deceased bun1ping his leg
against the motor of the car as claimed by plaintiff. The nature of the injury, the statements of
)Ir. Y ecchio to the doctors after he was injured,
the position of the n1otor on the car, all tend to
rebut plaintiff's claim in such respect. By a long
line of decisions this court has uniformly held
they will not disapprove findings made by the
Commission on conflieting evidence. That this
court is without authority in such case to interfere
with the Commission's finding is expressly provided by our Industrial Act, Rev. St. Utah 1933,
42-1-79. ''

Crane vs . .Ind. Comm., 97 Utah 244, 92 Pac. (2nd)
722. On April 4, 1938, ~lr. Crane fell while he was at
work in his employer's n1ine, and injured his back and
knee. He continued to work until May 7th, on which
date his leg was red and swollen and ached considerably.
He was sxamined by a do-ctor on 1\Iay lOth and his knee
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was found to be seriously affec-ted. On :May 14th a core
was taken from the knee. After a hearing, the Indus,trial Cmnmission denied his claim for compensation and
the Supreme Court sustained the Commission's decision.
In its decision the Court quoted the foUowing language
from the Kent, Parker and Hutchings cases:

Kellt vs. !Jidustrial Commision, 89 Utah 381, 57 Pac.
(2nd) 724.
"In the case of denial of compensation, the
record must disclose that there is n1aterial, substantial, co1npetent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Indush·ial
Commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to
believe such evidence. * * * When we are
asked to overturn the findings and conclusions
of the cmnmission denying compensation, it must
be n1ade clearly to appear that the commission
acted wholly without cause in rejecting or in refusing to believe or give effect to the evidence. It
is not intended by the \Yorkmen 's Compensation
Act (Rev. Ht. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq:) that this court,
in 1natters of evidence, should to any extent substitute the judgn1ent of the court upon factual
matters for the judgn1ent of the commission.''
Parl-ceT vs. Incl. Comm., 78 Utah 509, 5 Pac. (2d) 573.

•' This court is not authorized to weigh conflicting evidence, nor is it authorized to direct
which one of two or n1ore reasonable inferences
must be drawn frmn evidence which is riot in conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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flict. That i~ the peculiar pnH'ince of tlw Indus ..
trial l \mnnission. ·'
Hutclli1198

1\':.

Ind. CoJJI/11., 9() Utah 399, 87 l)ne.

(2nd) 11.
· · ~-\nd ~o it has been held in nnm<>rous cases
that the decision of the Industrial Con1mission
will not be disturbed "·here the evidence was such
that the Con11nissiou could reasonably find or conclude that the death or disability of the mnplo~·ee
was not the result of accidental injury arising ·out
of or in the course of en1ployn1ent. ''
Taggart rs. Ind. Comm., 79 Utah 598, 12 Pac. (2nd)
356. Taggart worked for Sperry Flour C01npany. He
died on April 27. 1931. as a result (according to his
widow's claim) ·of a weakened heart condition resulting
from loss of blood caused by hen1orrhage of the nose.
:Jlrs. Taggart claimed con1pensation on the basis that the
hemorrhage \Yas ·the result of accidental injury on August
11, 1928. The Industrial Commission found that there
was no ''accident'' and denied. the \Yiclow 's clain1. Th~
Supre1ne Court of Utah sustained the Comn1ission's decision and among other things said :

"The applicant failed to sustain the burden
of proving that the hemorrhage was due to an
accident. If it were conceded that the picking of
the nose or sudden blowing or sneezing was itself
such an accident for which compensation could
be given and the 1nere fact that it 'happened during the time of employment would satisfy the requirenlent of being in ,the course of the en1ploy1nent, there nevertheless is no evidence in this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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case to show that the hemorrhage occurred from
any such causes.''
In ·the case of Thompson vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 247,
23 Pac. (2nd) 930,. Thompson was an employee of the
Hylton Flour Mills at Ogden. His eyesight failed gradually for several years. He applied f·or compensation,
clain1ing that Hour dust got in his right eye on July 10,
1932, while he was shaking a dust collector, and that this
caused an ulcer of the eye to break one week later, resulting in almost .total blindness in the right eye. The Industrial Commission denied compensation, because there was
no ''accident.'' The Supren1e Court sustained the Comlniss~o~, and repeated the definiti•on of an ''accident''
':yhich we have already referred to. The Supren1e Court
opinion n1entions that the Industrial Con1n1ission found
that ''applicant has failed to sustain hy con1petent evidence his burden of proof to shmv that the co~dition
complained of 1\'as, either directly or indirectly due to
an accident arising out of or in the course of his employn1ent IYhile employed by the Hylton Flour Mills at Ogden, Utah." The Supreme Court held that this was equivalent to a finding ·that the applicant did' not sustain an
injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his
emplo~7 lnent:

"The ulti1na te fact to be found was whether
or riot the applicant sustained an injury by accident arising out of or in the course of employlnent. No direct finding was made on that detern1inative issue. The finding is that the applicant
failed to sus.tain the burden of proof. The burden
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of proving that he su~talned un injury b~· aeeidt>nt
in en1ployn1ent rested on the applicant. If hP
failed to do so, the finding should have hP('ll
against hiln. The finding as n1ade is equivalent
to a finding .that the applicant did not sustain an
injury by accident arising out of or in the course
of his en1ployment. If the connnission had used
such language. it ·would be a finding of the ultimate fact in issue. In vie\Y ·of the conclusion we
have reached on the facts, we are disposed .t1o trPat
the finding as one to the effect that applicant did
- not sustain an injury by accident in the course of
or arising out of his e1nployn1ent. Banks v. Ind.
Com., 74 Utah 166, 278 P. 58; Robinson v. Thomas,
75 "Gtah -!-!6, 286 P. 625.
Plaintiff cites and relies on the case of West
L:.

Standard Fuel Company (Utah), 17 P. (2nd)

291, 292, as holding it is the duty of the trial court
to make findings on all the rna terial issues raised
by the pleadings, and that it is prejudicial error
for it to fait to find on issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. That is undoubtedly the
general rule applicable to the making of findings
of fact by a eourt, but the rule is not applicable in
proceedings before the Industrial Commission.
The statute does not require the n1aking of findings of fact by the commission, _and this court
has held that findings of fact are not legally essential to a valid a ward, but has suggested that it
is advi_sable t·o make iindings of ultimate facts in
each case. ' '

Russell vs. Ind Co.mm., 86 Utah 306, 43 Pac. (2nd)
1069. \Villiam Russell, who was an en1ployee of the Cmnbined Metals Reduetion Con1pany, got a blister on one
of his toes about ~Iay 22, 1934. A week later he was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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taken violently ill and on June 7, 1934, died from what
the doctors concluded was t'oxic lymphangitis resulting
from an infection at the site of the blister on his toe.
His widow and children applied for compensation upon
the theory that the blister on his toe and tht> resultant
infection and dt_•ath "'ere caused by an accidental injury
arising out ,of or in the course of his en1ployment. After
a hearing the Industrial Cmnmission denied compensation and this denial -vvas sustained by the Supreme Court
of Utah. In the Court's decision at page 313 is found
the following language:
"By express statutory provisions and by a
long line of decisions of this court we are precluded fron1 ·weighing conflicting evidence and
making findings of fact. That is the province of
the con1mission. The duties ,of this court are
limited to a determination- of questions of la''T·
\Ye n1ay interfere vYith the COlllmission 's findings
of fact in those cases where an award is granted
without support of competent evidence, and, like'vise, where an award is denied against uncontradicted evidence without any reasonable basis
for disbelieving the san1e. In such cases a question of law is presented for detern1ination; otherwise, the findings of the comn1ission nTust be affirmed. Among the nun1erous cases from this
jurisdiction which announce the foregoing doctrine are Hauser v. Ind. Con1., 77 Utah 419, 296
P. 780; Parker v. Ind. Con1m., 78 Utah 509, 5 P.
(2nd) 573; Peterson v. Ind. Comn1., 83 Utah 94,
27 P. (2d) 31; and Osler v. Ind. Con1n1., 84 U.
428, 36 P. (2d) 95.
"In the instant case there Is no direct ev1-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
deiH'P as to when, how, or wlwre ~Lr. Russell rPceiYed the blistPr on his toe. HP mav have n'eeiYed the injury "·hile he \Vas working ~t thP mill,
but he 1nay. so far as the Pvidence discloses, have
received it else,vht>re. \Y'hen any one of two or
nwre inferences may reasonably be drawn fr01n
the evidence, this court is not authorized to direct
which inference n1ust be drawn, and, likewise,
when, as in the instant case, it is so1newhat of a
speculation as to where or how the deceased received the injury coinplained of, this court is precluded from dire0ting an award. To entitle the
plaintiff to prevail upon this review the evidence
n1ust be such that the only reasonable inference
permissible is that Mr. Russell received an accidental injury growing out of or in the eourse of
his emploJinent and that such injury resulfed in
his death. The evidence before us does not measure up to that standard. The commission may well
have entertained grave doubt as to when and
where Mr. Russell received the blister on his toe.

''In such case ~the order denying compansa.tion must be affirmed.''
In the case of Hutchings vs. Ind. Comnt., 96 Utah
399, 87 Pac. (2nd) 11, toward the end of the court's opinion is found the following :
"The question before the court is whether
the Industrial Commission upon the record before
it, was required as matter of law to award COn1pensation. In Globe Grain & Milling Company v.
Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 192, 193 P. 642, 643, we
st81ted the rule applicable here in the following
language:

a
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" 'This eourt has repeatedly held that it
will not weigh the evidence, but will examine
the same for the purpose only of determining
whether there is any substantial competent
evidence to sustain the findings or to support
the award made by the comn1ission. * * *
If there is such evidence the findings will be
sustained * * * '
''And so it has been held in nun1erous cases
that the decision of the Industrial Conm1ission
will not be disturbed where the evidence was such
that the Con1mission could reasonably find or
conclude that the death or disability of the employee \Yas not the result of accidental injury arising out of or in the course of employment.''
In the case of Banks vs. Ind. Cmnm., 74 Utah 166,
278 Pac. 58, the following language is found in the
Court's opinion:
''The evidence in thl· present case is not of
sufficient weight and force to con1n1and a finding
of accidental death. \\r e are not called upon to
decide whe,ther it is sufficient to sustain an a\\Tard,
had one been nuide, but assu1ning that it is sufficient for such purpose it does not f,o1low that the
com1nission was bound to n1ake an a\vard. ''
Substantially this san1e language can appropriately
lw used in referring to the case at bar.
Practically all of the argu111ent contained in Plaintiff's brief is directed to the proposition that the Industrial Comniissi,on should have believed l\1r. Dole's story
and should have found and concluded that he did sustain
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an ac-cidental injury on .Jlarch ~G. 1~)-H), as he alleged,
and that sueh aeeid~ntal injury was the cause of the detaehed retina whieh destroyPd the sight of his right eye.
This argtuuent Iuight haYe been proper if it had been
made by Plaintiff's attonwy to the Industrial Conunission in an endeavor to persuade the Conunission to award
con1pensation benefits to .Jlr. Dole, but it has no application to the question now before the Supre1ne Court.
Plaintiff's brief contained no citations and very little
argtunent relating to the only question which is now inYolved in this case, nainely ·what legal basis the Supreme
Court would have for declaring that the Industrial Commission was compelled to find in favor of the applicant
on all points and to award him con1pensation. There is
only one place in the Plaintiff's brief where we find
mention made of this spe<;ific point. Toward the bottom
of page 23 of Plaintiff's brief is found the following:
"As was said in the outset Mr. Dole was
alone, and apparently under some_ of the rulings
of this Court 'that is an unfortunate thing for

him.''
In that sentence Plaintiff's counsel gives a partial
gliinmer of the legal rule prevailing in a situation such
as is here
involved.
.
We admit that 1n the record there was testimony
from Dr. \Vhite of Salt Lake City and in the depositions
of the two Seattle doctors' testimony that Mr. Dole ~told
them he had had a severe jolting while driving his automobile in the spring of 1946. But Dr. \Vhite stated that
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the first tinw he saw Dole was 111 August 1946, which
\Yat-l over four n1onths after the occurrence referred to
on Redwood Road. The Seattle doctors first saw Dole
'On February 26, 1947, which was eleven 1nonths after the
alleged occurrence on Redwood Road. It clearly appears
that anything 1\lr. Dole told these three doctors regarding an alleged accidt>nt or severe shaking "·as by no
nwans spontaneous and was not within a short time after
the alleged occurrence. Oonsequently, any statements he
n1ade to thosP doctors do not come within the res gestae
rule.
The Industrial Con1n1ission \vas justified in accepting the conclusion to be drawn fron1 Dr. Saunders' testimony that .I\Ir. Dole told hi1n nothing about having had
an~· severe jolting and sudden los·s of vision the day
prior to first consulting Dr. Saunders, instead of accepting the hearsa~· staten1ents \Yhich 1\Ir. Dole made many
nwnths later to the other doctors who \vere involved in
his treatment.
As \Ye have stated at other places in our brief, the
question now before the Supren1e Court is whether the
Industrial Comn1ission "·as required as a 1natter of lmY
to find in Mr. Dole's favor and to a\Yard hin1 conlpensation benefits. Inasmuch as the Industrial Comn1ission
did not find in his favor and refused to award hin1 compensation benefits, it is in1proper for Plaintiff's counsel
to argue tha,t there is hearsay evidence which would havP
supported an award, if one had been n1ade.
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In conclusio!1 1nay we say that tlll~ Plaintiff, Frank
E. Dole, is entitled to the s~·m pn thy of all of us hP<·ans<'
of his unfortunate -condition. Apparently he has perntanently lost the sight of his right p~·P. This loss of ~ight
\Yas the result of a condition which the 1nedical experts
have stated so1netin1es results frmn an accident and
sometin1es results frmn conditions ·which cll'P not aeeidental. ~\fter a full and thorough hearing, the Industrial Com1nission, under the po·wers which have been
given to it by the Legislature, deternlined. that l\Ir. Dole
did not sustain an accidental injury in the course of his
employment as he had alleged. Under the same legislatiYe provisions, that detern1ination and decision of the
Industrial Commission is final and conclusive.
For the foregoing reasons the Industrial Con1111ission 's decision should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney General,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorneys for Defendants.
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